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Do Europe’s Minimum Income Schemes Provide Adequate 
Shelter against the Economic Crisis and How, If at All, 
Have Governments Responded? 
 
The present economic crisis comes against the background of decades of policy changes 
that have generally weakened the capacity of social safety nets to offer citizens with 
adequate resources for financial survival when labour markets fail to do so. Building on data 
for 24 European Union countries, this paper asks whether EU governments implemented 
additional measures during the first phase of the crisis to improve safety nets. Our data, 
drawn from a large network of national experts, show that many countries introduced 
supportive measures, in particular in the form of additional increases in gross minimum 
income benefits. More generous child benefits have also helped to increase net disposable 
incomes of families on minimum income. Behavioral requirements imposed on minimum 
income recipients have been neither tightened nor relaxed. In a limited number of countries, 
activation efforts aimed at minimum income recipients have been intensified. Despite some 
improvements, social safety nets in Europe remain far below widely accepted poverty 
thresholds, including the EU’s own official measure. 
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1  Introduction 
The financial and economic crisis we are witnessing today presents the ultimate challenge to Europe’s 
welfare states and particularly to the social safety nets there present. There has long been an interest in 
the role such major shocks play in shaping and re-shaping policies, possibly pulling long-standing 
(path-dependent  or  even  path-trapped)  policy  trajectories  off  course  (Castles,  2010;  Chung  & 
Thewissen, 2011; Vis, van Kersbergen, & Hylands, 2011). In that sense the crisis is of major scholarly 
interest. 
Arguably even more important is a more basic question. Do minimum income protection systems as 
these exist in the EU today succeed in protecting citizens against calamities over which they have 
little control and for which they cannot be held responsible? We know from earlier studies that the 
crisis  comes  against  the  background  of  decades  of  policy  changes  that  have  generally  (but  not 
universally)  weakened  the  capacity  of  European  welfare  states  to  provide  citizens  with  adequate 
incomes when labour markets fail to do so (Cantillon, Van Mechelen, Marx, & Van den Bosch, 2004; 
Nelson, 2010, forthcoming; Pfeifer, Bahle, & Hubl, 2011; Van Mechelen & Marchal, forthcoming). 
But exactly how adequate are minimum income provisions today and where are improvements most 
urgently needed? 
The focus of this paper is on the initial response to the economic crisis, in the period 2008-mid 2010. 
This paper deals with two questions, building on data gathered through a network of national experts. 
First, how, if at all, did EU governments adjust their minimum income protection policies in response 
to the crisis? Did that response prove to be a path-breaking or path-reinforcing event? And was there 
any communality in the response across the EU? Second, do minimum income schemes in the EU 
provide adequate protection against poverty? 
In the following section we present our data. Section three briefly touches upon changes in minimum 
income caseloads since the onset of the crisis. In section four we look at trends in gross benefit levels 
and  at  changes  in  other  income  components  affecting  net  income  packages  of  minimum  income 
recipients. We also assess the net income packages of minimum income recipients relative to the EU 
at-risk-of-poverty threshold. Section five extends this analysis and looks at aspects of conditionality. 
Section six concludes. 
2  Data 
The analysis draws on data gathered in the CSB-MIPI dataset. CSB-MIPI contains information on 
minimum income protection provisions for workers, for people at working age not in work, and for 
the elderly. By first defining the group at risk (for this paper, the working-aged able-bodied who fall 
outside the social insurance scheme and are without a job), equivalent schemes are compared across 
countries, instead of schemes that merely have a similar name. Table 1 provides an overview of the 
schemes selected based on this risk-type approach.  3 
 
Table 1.  Overview  of  European  social  assistance  schemes  for  able-bodied  persons  of 
working age, 2009 
Country  Name of applicable minimum income scheme 
AT (Vienna)  Sozialhilfe: Hilfe zur Sicherung des Lebensunterhalts 
B  Leefloon  
BG  Месечни социални помощи  (Monthly social assistance) 
CZ  Hmotná nouze (Social need) 
DK  Kontanthjælp 
EE  Toimetulekutoetus (Subsistence benefit) 
FI  Labour market subsidy & Social assistance 
FR  Revenu de solidarité active 
DE  Grundsicherung für Arbeitsuchende ￿ Arbeitlosengeld II  
HU  Rendszeres szociális segély & rendelkezésre állási támogatás 
IE  Jobseeker’s allowance 
IT (Milan)  Minimo Vitale 
LV  Pabalsts garantētā minimālā ienākumu līmeņa nodrošināšanai (Guaranteed Minimum Income) 
LT  socialinė pašalpa (Social assistance benefit) 
LU  Revenu Minimum Garanti 
N  Sosialhjelp Oslo 
NL  Wet Werk en Bijstand 
PL  Temporary social assistance benefit 
PT  Rendimento Social de Inserção 
RO  Legea Venitului Minim Garantat (Law on the Minimum Income Guarantee) 
SK  Pomoc v hmotnej núdzi (Assistance in material need) 
SI  Denarna socialna pomoč  (social assistance) 
ES (Catalonia)  Renda minima de inserció (RMI) (minimum income for labour insertion) 
SE  Ekonomiskt Bistånd (National defined part of Cash maintenance assistance) 
UK  Job Seekers Allowance (Income based) 
US (Nebraska, New Jersey,                          
Texas) 
Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program (SNAP), Temporary Assistance to Needy 
Families (TANF; only for families with children), General Assistance (regulated at state 
level) 
Source: Van Mechelen et al. (2011: 9-10) 
The data is provided by national experts on the basis of detailed questionnaires and instructions. Many 
have participated in earlier studies on social benefit packages (Bradshaw & Finch, 2002; Eardley, 
Bradshaw, Ditch, Gough, & Whiteford, 1996) and/or currently participate in EUROMOD
1. They are 
listed in appendix. 
The CSB-MIPI dataset contains gross time series on minimum wages, minimum income benefits and 
minimum income guarantees for elderly spanning two decades, from 1992 until 2009. The main focus 
of the dataset is on model family simulations of net disposable income for five household types per 
income situation, taking full account of taxes, social security contributions, means-tested supplements 
and child benefits. These simulations refer to three points in time, i.e. May 1992, June 2001 and June 
2009.  
During the last round of data gathering, which took place mid 2010, respondents also filled out three 
questionnaires. The first questionnaire gathered background information on the selected minimum 
income schemes, including national sources on the number of minimum income recipients. These 
were used to collect time series on caseloads (see section 3). Note that these data, contrary to the other 
                                                       
1 We are grateful to Holly Sutherland for encouraging EUROMOD experts to participate in the CSB-MIPI 
project. 4 
 
information presented in this paper, are not the core focus of the CSB-MIPI project. Therefore, these 
national data are not fully comparable. (For a discussion on the limits of administrative data on social 
assistance caseloads, see De Deken & Clasen, 2011.) 
The other questionnaires focused on, respectively, i) the conditionality of minimum income benefits, 
and ii) policy measures implemented after the onset of the crisis that affected net disposable income 
of minimum income recipients. This crisis questionnaire explicitly focused on the first round crisis 
measures taken between 2008 and mid 2010.  
In Austria, Italy and Spain, the minimum income scheme is a regional responsibility. The CSB-MIPI 
database contains information for respectively the regions Vienna, Milan and Catalonia. In Sweden 
and  Norway,  municipalities  have  a  large  degree  of  autonomy.  The  CSB-MIPI  database  provides 
information for Stockholm and Oslo. In the United States, the states are allowed to implement their 
own assistance schemes. Moreover, they have considerable autonomy in administering the federal 
minimum income schemes (SNAP, TANF). CSB-MIPI contains information on benefit levels and 
policy measures in the states Nebraska, New Jersey and Texas. More information on the methodology 
and content of the CSB-MIPI dataset can be found in Van Mechelen et al. (2011). 
3  Impact of the crisis on the number of social assistance recipients2 
The current crisis has brought an increase in unemployment in much of Europe. Some countries were 
especially hard hit, with unemployment more than doubling in Spain, Latvia, Ireland, Estonia and 
Lithuania (see Figure 1). 
Figure 1.  Quarterly unemployment rates, selected EU countries, 2007Q1 – 2011Q1 
 
Source: (Eurostat, 2011) 
                                                       
2 The current  section draws  on national data. Although these data are  not fully  comparable (for a detailed 
discussion see De Deken en Clasen (2011)), no feasible alternative is currently available. The scope of this 


















Rising  unemployment  has  led  to  increased  reliance  on  benefits  (OECD,  2011).  Although 
unemployment insurance (UI) schemes are supposed to bear the brunt of this burden, some have 
warned that the rise of atypical jobs and the declining generosity of UI schemes in recent years, will 
most likely result in increased reliance on minimum income schemes (Immervoll, 2009). 
Relative increases in social assistance caseloads did follow to a large extent changes in unemployment 
in the first crisis years. After a decline, or at least a stagnation of minimum income receipt by the mid 
2000s, a sudden and vast relative increase of social assistance caseloads is observed in most countries 
between 2008 and 2009. The number of social assistance recipients rose with approximately 10% in 
Belgium, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. Somewhat larger increases happened in 
Luxembourg and the US states. The largest increases occurred in Spain (Catalonia), Lithuania, Ireland 
and the United Kingdom, where the number of minimum income recipients nearly doubled. This 
overall image is confirmed by the joint report on social protection and social inclusion of 2010, that 
presents the situation in Austria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, the Slovak Republic, Portugal and 
Latvia. The increase in social assistance recipients from 2008 to 2009 amounts to more or less 11% in 
Austria  and  the  Czech  Republic  and  16%  in  Portugal,  while  also  the  remaining  countries  show 
increases (European Commission, 2010). In Germany, unemployment as well as  social assistance 
recipiency rates remained stable. 
Figure 2 presents recent trends in the number of minimum income recipients relative to the working 
age population
3. The figure adds nuance to the large percentage rises mentioned. For instance, despite 
the minimum income caseload nearly doubling in Catalonia, the minimum income scheme remains 
marginal, providing benefits to a mere 0.4% of the working age population in 2009. Large increases 
occurred mainly in those countries where the minimum income scheme already played a larger role in 
the welfare state to begin with. Lithuania seems to be an exception. 
The largest increases happened in Finland (though only within the social assistance scheme, and not 
in the categorical labour market subsidy
4), Ireland, Lithuania, the United Kingdom and the three US 
states,  and,  more  limited,  in  Luxembourg  and  Sweden.  These  countries  had  a  relatively  large 
minimum income caseload already before the crisis, because of the more prominent role of minimum 
income  provision  there.  The  number  of  minimum  income  recipients  thus  did  not  only  increase 
substantially in those countries where the scheme fills the gap of a residual unemployment insurance 
scheme (such as in the United Kingdom and Ireland), but also increased starkly in countries where the 
minimum income scheme acts as a top-up to low wages and social security benefits (as in Finland and 
Luxembourg).  
                                                       
3 One could discuss the validity of the denominator “working age population” (here: those aged 15-64 years). In 
some countries, minors or persons under a certain age are not eligible for social assistance. Also, persons above 
pensionable age may receive benefits from the same scheme as working aged recipients in some countries. 
4 The labour market subsidy provides benefits to the specific target group of able-bodied working aged persons 
without a job and not eligible for unemployment insurance benefits. Social assistance is the general social safety 
net. However, social assistance tops up various benefits, such as the labour market subsidy. Therefore, both are 
presented here. For more information, see Van Mechelen and Marchal, forthcoming. 6 
 
Figure 2.  The number of social assistance recipients relative to the working age population, 
selected EU countries, 2000 – 2010 
 
Note: LMS: labour market subsidy, SA: social assistance; N: Nebraska, NJ: New Jersey, T: Texas 
Sources: (Bundesagentur für Arbeit, 2010; Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, 2011; Department for work and 
pensions, 2011; Department  of social protection; Eurostat, 2011;  Financial  Supervisory  Authority  & Social 
Insurance Institution, 2010; Food Research and Action Center, 2011; Generalitat de Catalunya, 2010; Idescat, 
2011; POD Maatschappelijke Integratie, 2011; Service Nationale d'Action Sociale, 2011; Socialstyrelsen, 2011; 
Statistics Norway, 2011; Statistikos departamentas, 2011; U.S. Census Bureau, 2011)  
All in all, there are indications that social assistance schemes have grown in importance during the 
crisis.  This increased relevance  calls for an  assessment  of the  impact of crisis measures on their 
capacity to protect citizens against poverty. 
4  Impact of the crisis on the level of social assistance benefits 
The most important objectives of minimum income protection is the alleviation of poverty (Hölsch & 
Kraus,  2004;  Nelson,  forthcoming).  A  relatively  straightforward  way  to  gauge  the  potential  of 
minimum income schemes to protect against poverty is to look at benefit levels. Various studies have 
documented the general inadequacy of minimum income benefits in years prior to the crisis (Cantillon, 
et al., 2004; Nelson, forthcoming; Pfeifer, et al., 2011). In most countries, minimum income benefits 
have eroded substantially over the past decades relative to various indicators. In a large number of 
countries minimum income benefits have not kept pace with average living standards (as proxied by 
trends in average wages and median equivalised income). Especially during the 90s, benefit packages 
did  not  maintain  their  purchasing  power  in  some  countries  (Cantillon,  et  al.,  2004;  Nelson, 
forthcoming; Van Mechelen & Marchal, forthcoming).   
The  following  subsections  discuss  how  the  crisis  measures,  where  they  were  implemented,  have 




























































































First,  we  assess  changes  in  gross  benefit  levels.  Though  the  actual  living  standard  of  minimum  
income recipients is best captured by their net disposable income, gross minimum income benefits 
determine to a large extent disposable income. Moreover, the time series data we have available allow 
us to set changes in gross benefit levels against previous trends, bringing to light whether the crisis 
has  led  to  a  change  in  policy.  Trends  in  gross  benefits  are  assessed  against  different  indicators, 
including trends in consumer prices and gross average wages.  
However, governments have far more tools at their disposal to influence the protective capacity of 
minimum income schemes. Net income packages of minimum income recipients are determined by 
many factors, including taxes and tax credits, social security contributions, child benefits and other 
supplements,  such  as  housing  allowances.  Moreover,  the  generosity  of  a  minimum  income  also 
effectively depends on the strength of the means-test or the duration of the benefit. Thus, the second 
part of this section looks at how measures taken during the first phase of the crisis have affected these 
components. 
Finally,  we  ask  whether  minimum  income  protection  provisions  effectively  provide  adequate 
protection against poverty, as it is currently measured in the EU.  
4.1  Gross social assistance benefits 
Trends in gross benefits are generally assessed against increases in prices (Pfeifer, et al., 2011)  or 
against indicators reflecting the development of overall living standards (Cantillon, et al., 2004; Van 
Mechelen, Marx, Marchal, Goedemé, & Cantillon, 2010). This paper also presents the real benefit 
trends, as well as gross benefit trends relative to a benchmark for average living standard. Moreover, 
since the crisis has impacted on the denominators, we present trends in nominal values as well. 
Table 2 presents the yearly percentage change in nominal gross social assistance benefit levels. In the 
years  before  the  crisis,  countries  steadily  increased  benefits.  Exceptions  are  the  Czech  Republic, 
where nominal gross benefits for couples decreased by 26% in 2007, and the Slovak Republic, where 
benefit levels more than halved in 2004. In both countries, declines were caused by far-reaching 
reforms of the social assistance scheme. The Czech reform split the minimum income scheme into a 
separate housing allowance and social assistance scheme. Since most social assistance recipients still 
apply for housing  allowances  under  the  new  scheme,  effects on net disposable  income  are  more 
moderate. The Slovak reform cut the minimum income benefit to a (very) low base amount, that can 
be topped up by additional conditional benefits.  
Table 2 shows that the growth of gross social assistance benefits generally did not halt after the onset 
of the crisis. In Latvia, Romania and the United Kingdom, gross benefits increased even more in the 
first crisis years than before. However, some countries did not maintain growth rates later on in the 
crisis. For instance, in Austria (Vienna), growth of nominal benefits decelerated in 2010 as compared 
to  the  previous  decade.  Similar  decelerations  have  taken  place  in  the  Netherlands,  Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain (Catalonia).  
Changes in benefit levels during the crisis are especially remarkable in Estonia and Ireland. Growth of 
social assistance benefits had halted in Estonia already in 2008, after some strong nominal increases 
in the previous years. Only Ireland cut minimum income benefits in 2010. For both countries, this was 
an attempt to control state finances in response to the crisis.  8 
 
Table 2.  Year-to-year nominal change of gross social assistance benefit level, in %, couple 
a: average annual nominal change in gross social assistance benefit 
Note: data for IE and FI refer to gross social assistance benefits for a single; FI (Labour Market Subsidy); NO 
and SK: average annual nominal change over period 2002-2006; PL, HU: n.a.; EL: no minimum income scheme. 
Source: CSB-MIPI (Van Mechelen et al., 2011); (European Commission, 2011) 
Table 3  shows  that  during the  years  prior to  the  crisis, gross benefits generally maintained  their 
purchasing power. In more than a few countries, benefit levels even increased (somewhat) more than 
consumer prices. Nevertheless, there are some important exceptions, mainly in those countries where 
no  automatic  indexation  procedure  exists.  This  is  the  case  in,  for  instance,  Bulgaria  and  Latvia. 
However, discretionary indexation not necessarily leads to erosion. Benefit levels increased faster 
than consumer prices in, for instance, Ireland, Lithuania and Estonia, due to substantial hikes enacted 
by the government (see also Van Mechelen and Marchal, forthcoming).  
Immediately after the onset of the crisis, real benefits generally increased. In some countries, these 
increases are substantially above previous growth rates, especially in the Eastern European countries 
Bulgaria and Latvia. The substantial hikes in Lithuania had already started before the onset of the 
crisis.  The  deceleration  in  nominal  growth  seen  for  2009-2010  (see  Table  2),  has  led  in  some 
countries to a small loss in purchasing power. However, this decrease seems very much in line with 
trends in real benefits in pre-crisis years.    
  ’00-‘06
a  ‘06 - ‘07  ‘07 - ‘08  ‘08 - ‘09  ‘09 - ‘10 
AT  2,8  2  3  4  1 
BE  2,9  3  6  4  n.a. 
BG  n.a.  n.a.  0  18  n.a. 
CZ  1,1  -26  0  0  n.a. 
DE  3,7  1  2  2  n.a. 
DK  2,8  2  3  3  4 
EE  8,3  20  11  0  n.a. 
ES  3,4  9  4  3  1 
FI*  2,1  1  2  3  5 
FR  1,8  2  2  2  1 
IE*  9,5  12  6  3  -4 
IT  3,0  2  2  3  n.a. 
LT  n.a.  32  39  23  0 
LU  3,3  4  2  4  0 
LV  n.a.  13  0  37  8 
NL  3,5  3  2  1  1 
NO*  2,0  6  7  3  n.a. 
PT  5,5  3  3  3  1 
RO  53,1  4  5  8  15 
SE  1,9  3  4  4  n.a. 
SI  12,0  2  4  4  2 
SK*  -12,5  6  2  5  3 
UK  1,6  3  2  6  2 9 
 
Table 3.  Year-to-year  percentage  change  of  gross  social  assistance  benefit  level,  2010 
prices (HICP), couple 
  ’00-‘06
a  ‘06 - ‘07  ‘07 - ‘08  ‘08 - ‘09  ‘09 - ‘10 
AT  1  -1  0  3  0 
BE  1  1  2  4  0 
BG  n.a.  n.a.  -11  15  n.a. 
CZ  -1  -28  -6  -1  n.a. 
DE  2  -1  -1  2  n.a. 
DK  1  1  -1  2  1 
EE  4  12  0  0  n.a. 
ES  0  6  0  3  -1 
FI*  1  0  -2  1  3 
FR  0  0  -2  1  -1 
IE*  6  9  3  5  -3 
IT  1  0  -2  3  n.a. 
LT  4  25  25  18  -1 
LU  0  1  -2  4  -3 
LV  8  2  -13  33  9 
NL  1  1  0  1  0 
NO*  0  6  3  1  n.a. 
PT  2  1  0  4  0 
RO  30  -1  -3  3  8 
SE  0  1  1  2  n.a. 
SI  6  -1  -2  3  0 
SK*  -17  4  -2  4  3 
UK  0  1  -1  4  -2 
a: average annual nominal change in gross social assistance benefit 
Note: data for IE and FI refer to gross social assistance benefits for a single; FI (Labour Market Subsidy); NO 
and SK: average annual nominal change over period 2002-2006; PL, HU: n.a.; EL: no minimum income scheme. 
Source: CSB-MIPI (Van Mechelen et al., 2011); (European Commission, 2011) 
Figure 3 presents trends in minimum income benefits relative to average living standards, proxied 
here by the gross average wage. For the sake of presentation, countries are grouped by the extent of 
erosion of benefit levels during the preceding decade (2000-2007).  
Figure  3  shows  that  during  the  previous  decade,  benefit  levels  have  eroded  relative  to  overall 
prosperity of society in more than half of the countries in our sample. Only Ireland, Portugal, Spain 
(Catalonia), Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany and Austria (Vienna) succeeded in maintaining or 
improving relative gross social assistance benefits. However, these countries had allowed a substantial 
erosion of gross benefit levels in the 1990s, as documented in previous research (Cantillon, et al., 
2004, see also figure A in appendix). Romania and Slovenia had in 2007 benefit levels that were, 
relative to average wages, far more generous than at the start of the decade, though this was mostly 
the consequence of a one-time reform, followed by subsequent erosion.  
What happened after the onset of the crisis? We do not see a common response. In the countries 
where gross benefits eroded most during the past decade, in the Czech Republic and in Finland, this 
erosion continued during the crisis. Benefit levels stagnated in the Slovak Republic. On the other hand, 10 
 
strong  rises  in  gross  benefits  relative  to  gross  average  wage  occurred  in  the  United  Kingdom, 
Lithuania, and Estonia. In the latter country, gross average wages were substantially affected by the 
crisis. 
In those countries where erosion was limited over the past decade, again, a mixed picture emerges. In 
most countries, crisis measures did not counter the gradual erosion of previous years. However, in 
Lithuania,  strong  nominal  increases  ensured  that  benefits  grew  over  and  above  average  wages. 
Although these increases had already started in 2006, their pace accelerated during the crisis. In Italy 
(Milan), gross benefits increased somewhat at the start of the crisis, although the impact is limited. 
Both in Slovenia and in Romania the crisis came after years of benefit erosion. In both countries, this 
erosion was countered. Other increases occurred in Belgium, Ireland and Germany
5. Yet in the first 
two countries this increase seems to be in line with earlier developments. On the other hand, in the 
Netherlands and Portugal, gross benefits eroded marginally.  
All in all, gross social assistance benefits have not suffered serious blows during the crisis. In nominal 
as well as real terms, increases are to be observed, especially immediately after the start of the crisis. 
In relative terms, increases of gross benefit levels are in line with earlier trends for most countries. We 
do not observe a general break in trends or exceptional reactions, except for the nominal decrease of 
social assistance benefits in Ireland, and the strong increases in Lithuania and Latvia. It remains to be 
seen whether the latter countries have indeed embarked on a new, more generous path. Absence of 
nominal increases in 2009-2010 (Lithuania) and 2010-2011 (Latvia) suggest this is not the case. Other 
policy measures impacting on the income of social assistance recipients do not directly appear in time 
series  on  gross  benefits.  Governments  may  well  be  inclined  towards  alternative  measures,  as 
retrenchment  in  gross  benefit  levels  is  rather  visible  and  potentially  controversial.  Thus  the  next 
section  asks  whether  governments  used  other  routes  to  implement  changes  in  minimum  income 
protection systems.  
                                                       
5 Not in figure.  11 
 
Figure 3.  Trends in gross social assistance benefits for a couple relative to gross average 
wages, 2000-2009/2010, 2000=100* 
 
*SK: 2002=100; LV: 2004=100. FI: gross benefit for a single.  
 
*NO: 2002=100; PL and LT: 2004=100  
 
*countries are grouped according to former evolution. (large erosion, minor erosion, equal or increase) 


















































































































































































4.2  Net disposable incomes of social assistance recipients 
Table  4  shows  policy  changes  affecting  net  disposable  income  packages  of  minimum  income 
recipients, including policy changes affecting child benefits, taxes, social security contributions and 
(also) gross benefit levels. It also includes measures affecting the generosity of income packages in 
more indirect ways, by changing time limits or income criteria. Please note that we do not include 
regular indexation.  
Table 4 splits policy measures in those taken before June 2009 and those issued between July 2009 
and mid 2010
6. This division is caused by the set-up of our data-gathering effort, with policy changes 
taken before mid 2009 still reflected in the model family simulations for 2009
7. If available, more 
detailed information on the implementation date is included.  Therefore, the information provided by 
national respondents (see section 2) is supplemented with information from MISSOC and the OECD 
Benefit and Wages country reports. It is possible that not all the measures reported in the table are 
genuine crisis measures.  
Countries that did not report measures affecting net disposable income of social assistance benefits 
are  Denmark,  Spain,  Finland,  Italy,  the  Netherlands,  Sweden,  Slovenia  and  Slovakia
8.  As  for 
Denmark and Italy, possibly in-kind benefits or services helped to cushion the impact of the crisis. In 
Finland, the crisis effectively prevented expected increases, but no cuts were enacted.  
In general, most countries took measures that raised the net disposable incomes of social assistance 
recipients, either by directly raising social assistance benefits (BE, BG, LT, LV, IE, NO, RO and the 
UK) or by introducing a supplementary allowance (Luxembourg). Also in the US, benefits under the 
Supplemental  Nutritional  Assistance  Program  (SNAP,  food  stamps)  were  increased  by  13.6%. 
Immervoll and Llena-Nozal (2011) report similar measures for other OECD countries. A number of 
countries chose to increase child related benefits (AT, DE, IE, LT, PT, RO, UK). France awarded one-
off  measures  to  particular  groups  of  the  low-income  population.  One  of  these  measures  was 
conditional  upon  having  children  of  school-age.  Slovenia  awarded  a  one-time  supplement  to  its 
minimum income recipients during the crisis. 
Most of these expansionary anti-crisis measures were taken before or during the summer of 2009. 
Only in Latvia, Romania and the United Kingdom, increases of gross benefits apart from regular 
indexation were enacted more recently. This lack of new measures during 2010 may be due to a wish 
or a need to limit expenditures, at a time when the budgetary challenges of the crisis were gaining 
more attention.  
   
                                                       
6 Other  presentations  of  these  crisis  measures  are  conceivable.  For  instance,  Hemerijck  (Hemerijck,  2012) 
argues that the perception and nature of the crisis changed by the end of 2009, turning from a recession into a 
budgetary crisis. 
7 See Figure 4 on the adequacy of net benefit levels. 
8 Greece is not included since no general minimum income scheme exists in this country. 13 
 
Table 4.   Overview of measures affecting net disposable income at social assistance since 
2008 until mid 2010 
  After onset crisis (until June 2009)  More recent measures (July 2009-Mid 2010) 
AT  Net: Universal rise of child tax credit and child benefit  Gross: September 2010: new minimum income benefit 
scheme, that presumably benefits social assistance 
recipients* 
BE  Gross: 2008: rise by 2% 
2009: rise by 2% 
 
BG  Gross: 2009: rise by 18.2% 
1/7/2008: Stricter time limit: duration limited to 12 
months (previously 18 months)* 
 
CZ  Gross: decrease after 6 months of benefit receipt *   
DE    Net: July 2009: temporary increase of child related 
lump-sum benefits in determination of the level of the 
Arbeitlosengeld II 
EE  Net: abolishment of school allowance   
FR  Net: one-off measures (lump-sum benefits) for 
certain groups of low-income households 
 
HU  Gross: Rise, but conditional upon participation in 
employment programme* 
Gross: decline: January 2010: only one adult per 
household eligible for higher benefit  
Net : January 2010: decreased eligibility period for child 
benefit  
IE  Gross: rise 
 
Net: increase in support for lone parent families  
Gross: decline  (January 2010) 
Net: Reduction of child benefits and support for lone 
parent families 
LT  Gross: January and August 2008: increase of state-
supported income from LTL 235 to LTL 350  
Net: 2008: laxer means-test (exclusion of certain 
income sources) 
July 2008: increase in child benefit 
2009:  child benefit has become means-tested.  
Net:January 2010:  income limit for means-tested child 
benefit was halved, from 1050LTL to 525 LTL. 
LU  Net: - Introduction of cost of living allowance 
        - Linear increase of tax brackets 
 
LV  Gross: January 2009: rise  
 
Gross: October 2009: rise   
Net:  - July 2009: temporary decline of child benefit   
         - January 2010: Withdrawal of ceiling of benefits  
           (in case of large families)  
July 2009: abolishment of time limits 
December 2009: Means-test: less strict  
NO  Gross: rise of benefits in national guidelines by 5%   
PL    Gross: Envisaged indexation did not occur 
PT  Net: increase of child benefits for low income 
categories 
Net: June 2010: end of complementary support  
Stricter means test 
RO  Gross: rise  
Net: child benefit extended 
Gross: rise + financing fully covered by national 
government 
Net: lower eligibility threshold for heating allowance 
(July 2009) 
SI    August 2009: one-off supplement 
UK  Gross: increase (April 2009) 
Net: rise of child tax credit and child benefit 
Gross: increase (April 2010) 
Net: rise of child tax credit and child benefit 
US  Gross: increase of SNAP benefits   
* Respondent indicates that the measure was already legislated before the onset of the crisis: no crisis measure. 
Source: CSB-MIPI (Van Mechelen et al., 2011), (European Commission, 2011), (OECD, 2010) 
On the other hand, “negative” measures were remarkably absent immediately after the onset of the 
crisis. Estonia abolished a school allowance, whereas Lithuania combined a considerable increase of 
gross  social  assistance  benefits  with  making  the  child  benefit  means-tested  out  of  budgetary 14 
 
considerations.  Also  the  Czech  Republic  implemented  a  measure  negatively  impacting  on  net 
disposable income. However, both in the Czech Republic and Hungary, the measures enacted in the 
first  crisis  years  were  no  genuine  crisis  measures,  but  were  part  of  more  far-reaching  reforms 
legislated before the onset of the crisis. In the Czech Republic, the reform stipulated that after six 
months of benefit receipt, gross benefits are diminished, unless one has participated in active labour 
market programmes. In Hungary, a new benefit was introduced in 2009 for those of working age that 
are able to work. Adults receive higher (individual) benefits, but benefit receipt is made conditional 
upon participation in ALMPs. The Bulgarian tightening of time limits also appears part of a broader 
government  strategy,  initiated  in  2006,  taking  a  tougher  line  on  minimum  income  recipients 
(Bogdanov & Zahariev, 2009).  
In a later stage of the crisis negative measures became more common. Although Romania and Latvia 
introduced already in the summer of 2009 some minor cuts, these were still followed by additional 
increases  in  gross  benefits.  These  increases  were  far  from  trivial  (see  section  4.1),  whereas  the 
negative measures, a decrease of the universal child benefit in Latvia and a lower eligibility threshold 
for a heating allowance in Romania, were relatively moderate. In Poland, the planned three-yearly 
indexation of benefit thresholds was skipped. In 2010, four more countries implemented measures that 
had a negative impact on net income of minimum income recipients. The Irish government cut gross 
social assistance and child benefits. In Lithuania, the earlier introduced means-test for child benefits 
was tightened. The Portuguese government tightened access to minimum income benefits. In Hungary, 
a measure introduced by the 2009 reform, was partly withdrawn. From 2010 on, only one adult per 
household can qualify for a higher benefit. 
These retrenchment measures are relatively diverse. A number of countries effectively diminished or 
abolished benefits (although only one country has gone as far as to cut minimum income benefits), 
whereas other countries have made access to benefits harder by introducing or strengthening means-
tests. All in all, reductions of net disposable income are mostly not directly caused by changes in the 
minimum income scheme, but are achieved more indirectly, through the child benefits scheme and, in 
a less visible way, by lowering eligibility thresholds and skipping indexation.  
4.3  How well do minimum income protection provisions protect against 
poverty? 
We  now  turn  to  the  question  of  how  adequate  minimum  income  protection  provisions  are  in 
protecting against poverty. In its resolution of 20 October 2010 on the role of minimum income in 
combating poverty and promoting an inclusive society in Europe, the European Parliament ‘takes the 
view that adequate minimum income schemes must set minimum incomes at a level equivalent to at 
least  60%  of  median  income  in  the  Member  State  concerned’  (European  Parliament,  2010).  The 
European poverty line is thus put forward as a reference point to assess the adequacy of benefit levels, 
despite the fact that the debate on whether this operationalisation of poverty is appropriate has revived 
recently as a result of the enlargement of the EU (Fahey, 2007).  
Figure 4 uses the EU poverty line to assess the adequacy of benefit levels. This figure includes all the 
measures mentioned in the first column of Figure 4, i.e. the measures implemented before the end of 
June 2009
9. The figure shows that social assistance benefit packages (including housing allowances 
                                                       
9 The Hungarian reform is the only exception. 15 
 
and  child  benefits  but  excluding  in-kind  benefits  and  associated  rights)  are  above  the  European 
poverty line only in Ireland (for single person households) and in Denmark (for couples). It remains to 
be seen how the recent cuts in Irish minimum income benefits will influence this ranking. In the other 
EU Member States social assistance benefit packages are insufficient to protect benefit recipients and 
their households against poverty
10.  
In the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Belgium, Austria (Vienna), Germany, France, but also in Latvia 
benefit levels are between 40% and 50% of median equivalent household income, although there is 
generally considerable variation across family types. In the majority of countries social assistance 
payments are usually below 40% of median income, especially for households without children. This 
is even the case in rich Member States such as Finland, Sweden, Norway and the United Kingdom. In 
the Slovak Republic, Estonia, Bulgaria and Romania, benefit levels are typically set below half the 
poverty  line.  Following  a  different  methodology,  Figari  et  al.  (2011)  also  points  to  the  general 
inadequacy of minimum income schemes.  
Figure  4  also  shows  that  the  countries  where  measures  have  been  taken  negatively  affecting  net 
disposable incomes of minimum income beneficiaries (EE, HU, PT, PL, IE, and, more moderately: 
LT, RO, LV) are not uniformly among the most generous countries. Although Ireland had the most 
generous minimum income benefits for able-bodied working-aged persons before the cuts
11, other 
countries, such as Estonia, find themselves at the other end of the spectrum.  
 
                                                       
10 The CSB-MIPI-estimates of net social assistance benefit packages tend to provide a(n even) less favourable 
picture  of  the  adequacy  of  assistance  payments  than  the  estimates  presented  in  the  OECD’s  Employment 
Outlook 2009. This is largely explained by the fact that the CSB-MIPI data draw on much lower housing costs. 
Whereas the CSB-MIPI study  focuses  on  households with a rental costs equal to only  2/3 of  median rent 
(SILC), the OECD estimates are based on the assumption that in all countries housing costs are equal to 20% of 
average wage, for all family types (see Van Mechelen et al, 2011).  
11 In fact, this leading position was used to defend these cuts, according to Dukelow (2011).  16 
 
Figure 4.  The adequacy of net social assistance benefit packages, 2009 
 
 
Note: In some countries, such as the US, Italy and Bulgaria, time limits apply, either formal or discretionary. In 
order to avoid additional assumptions, the levels displayed do not take these time limits into account. 
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5  Changes in behavioral requirements 
This section looks at changes in behavioral requirements as these apply to people receiving social 
assistance or equivalent support
12. Behavioral requirements do not directly impact on the generosity of 
net income, but aim to regulate behavior of minimum income recipients through the use of sanctions 
or supportive measures (or both), possibly coupled with investments in their skills/human capital. In 
previous years, this aspect of minimum income schemes has gained in importance, as governments 
have become more focused on activation (Eichhorst & Konle-Seidl, 2008; Weishaupt, forthcoming). 
Table 5 provides an overview of changes in behavioral conditionality (and the closely intertwined 
social investment) measures implemented since the onset of the crisis. This table mainly describes the 
impact  of  the  crisis  on  the  legal  rules  applying  to  social  assistance  recipients.  Differences  in 
implementation are understandably harder to capture. 
Only for a limited number of countries, our experts report changes in behavioral requirements during 
the  crisis  period  under  review.  Even  so,  most  of  these  changes  were  implementations  of  earlier 
legislated  reforms.  In  only  six  countries,  changes  were  reportedly  implemented  during  the  crisis 
period: Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Portugal, Romania and the UK.  In four countries (Finland, Latvia, 
Portugal and the UK), active labour market measures for minimum income recipients were expanded, 
or participation financially encouraged. Portugal is apparently the only country that imposed harsher 
sanctions  in  case  of  non-compliance.  Active  labour  market  programmes  were  also  expanded 
elsewhere in Europe, for instance in Ireland
13, Sweden and Denmark, but it is not clear to what extent 
minimum income beneficiaries have benefited in these countries. (Bonoli, 2010; Chung & Thewissen, 
2011; Weishaupt, 2011).   
Only in two countries, Romania and Estonia, behavioral requirements became less strict during the 
crisis period. However, the changes apply to a very small subset of the social assistance population 
(for instance in Romania: those adults caring for a handicapped child aged 16-18 years).  
   
                                                       
12 The focus of the CSB-MIPI questionnaire was on regulations with regard to behavioral conditionality, thus 
regulating ongoing benefit receipt. Crisis measures may also have impacted on other types of conditionality, 
such as the means-test (see section 4.2). 
13 The budget of the public employment service was raised in Ireland. However, it is not clear whether this 
actually benefited social assistance recipients. Dukelow (2011:422) mentioned that “prior to the full unslaught 
of the economic crisis … retrenchment focused on the less visible areas of conditions and entitlements”. Also, 
according to the citizens information board, some active labour market programmes were made inaccessible by 
mid 2009 (Citizens information board, 2011)  18 
 
Table 5.  Overview of changes in behavioral requirements from 2008 on until mid 2010 
  After onset crisis (until June 2009)  More recent measures (July 2009-Mid 2010) 
CZ*  After  6  months  of  SA  receipt,  benefit  is  reduced  unless  one 
participates  in  public  work  or  volunteer  services  (at  least  20 
hours/week)* 
 
EE  1/5/2009: Less strict suitable work criterium   
FI  SA: Regulation to reduce waiting lists. More swiftly responding 
to new demands and need of social assistance recipients.* 
LMS: 1/1/2010:  maximum period of participation in 
re-employment  programmes  opening  right  to 
supplement was increased from 185 to 200 days.  
Activation  measures  that  entitle  to  increased 
benefits  are  defined  more  broadly.  Increase  of 
activation allowance awarded upon participation in 
activation measures. 
FR  Introduction of rSa (june 2009): new activity requirements.* 
But: not yet visible in practice because of crisis 
 
HU*  “Road  to  work”:  public  employment  organized  by  local 
government  for  long-term  unemployed  and  social  assistance 
beneficiaries (separate scheme with higher benefit)* 
 
LV    Sept  2009:  Introduction  of  new  ALMP:  “Work 
practice in municipalities with a stipend”  
NL    1/10/2009: investment in the young act came into 
force: youngsters must comply to more conditions 
in order to receive a benefit * 
PT  January 2009: introduction of new ALMP “employment contract 
insertion plus” 
June  2010:  Offer  of  active  labour  market 
programmes will be expanded, so as to ensure a 
maximum waiting period of 6 months. 
Harsher sanctions, especially in the case of fraud. 
RO  Less  strict  activity  requirements  for  adults  with  care 
responsibilities 
 
UK   Expansion of active labour market programmes: 6
th month offer 
(April 2009) 
Expansion  of  active  labour  market  programmes: 
“support  for  the  newly  unemployed”,  “Young 
person’s guarantee” and “Future job fund” (October 
2009) 
*: respondent notes that this change was already legislated before the onset of the crisis. 
Source: CSB-MIPI (see Van Mechelen et al., 2011) 
 
6  Conclusion 
This paper has dealt with two basic questions. First, how, if at all, did EU governments adjust their 
minimum income protection policies in response to the initial phase of the current crisis? Did that 
response prove to be a path-breaking event, and was there any communality in the response across the 
EU? Second, do minimum income schemes in the EU provide adequate protection against poverty?  
As for the first question, we find a general pattern of increases in gross minimum income benefits 
levels across the EU during the first phase of the crisis. These hikes by and large sufficed to keep 
benefits in line with average living standards, be it that exceptions exist. In some countries these 
increases countered a trend of gradual decline during the pre-crisis years. Yet the size of the increases 
does not point to marked breaks in long-term trends.  
In a substantial number of countries we find (additional) measures to boost the net income packages 
of households reliant on social assistance or equivalent minimum income support. Most frequent are 
(targeted) hikes in child-related benefits. Some countries have awarded one-off lump-sum benefits. 19 
 
Behavioral requirements imposed on minimum income recipients have been neither tightened nor 
relaxed. In a limited number of countries, activation efforts aimed at minimum income recipients have 
been intensified. 
Although  supportive measures are the  general pattern  during  the  initial phase  of the crisis,  some 
retrenchment  measures  are  evident  later  on in  at  least  a  number  of  countries.  Examples  include: 
skipping indexation, tightening the means-test, abolishment or decrease of additional benefits (for 
instance child benefits). Only one country, Ireland, has actually cut minimum income benefits. 
Despite a number of positive developments, net incomes of minimum income recipients continue to 
fall well short of the EU’s at risk of poverty threshold in all but two EU countries. The size of the gap 
between the level of the social safety net and the poverty threshold varies across countries and family 
types, but it is generally quite substantial. In that sense, the fact that minimum income schemes have 
turned out remarkably resilient during the first crisis period offers little reason for complacence. 
In the meanwhile, pressures for public spending cuts have mounted in most EU countries, in some 
countries to levels not seen in generations. Policy change in the direction of retrenchment seems not 
implausible. Both the UK and the Netherlands have already announced far-reaching reforms of their 
minimum income schemes. A close and continued monitoring of Europe’s social safety nets seems in 
order.   20 
 
7  Appendix 
Table A.  List of national experts 
Austria  FUCHS  Michael  European Centre for Social Welfare Policy and Research, Wien 
   STANZL  Peter  City of Vienna 
Belgium  VAN MECHELEN  Natascha  Herman Deleeck Centre for Social Policy (CSB), University of Antwerp 
   MARCHAL  Sarah 
Bulgaria  BOSHNAKOV  Venelin  University of National and World Economy, Sofia 
   DRAGANOV  Dragomir  Senior Expert Policies and Strategies, Ministry of Labour and Social Policy 
Czech Republic  MUNICH  Daniel  Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economic Institute 
(CERGE-EI), Prague 
   PAVEL  Jan 
Denmark  ABRAHAMSON  Peter  University of Copenhagen 
Estonia  VÕRK  Andres  University of Tartu / Praxis Center for Policy Studies 
Finland  KANGAS  Olli  Kela, Helsinki 
   HAATAJA  Anita 
France  MATH  Antoine  Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES), Paris 
Germany  BAHLE  Thomas  Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung (MZES) 
   HUBL  Vanessa  Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung (MZES) 
Greece  MATSAGANIS  Manos  Athens University of Economics and Business 
Hungary  SZIVÓS  Péter  Tárki, Budapest 
Italy  KAZEPOV  Yuri  University of Urbino  
   SABATINELLI  Stefania  University of Milan-Bicocca 
   ARLOTTI  Marco  University of Brescia 
Ireland  MAITRE  Bertrand  The Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI), Dublin 
Latvia  VANAGS  Alf  Baltic International Center for Economic Policy Studies (BICEPS), Riga 
   VASILJEVA  Kristine  Baltic International Center for Economic Policy Studies (BICEPS), Riga 
Lithuania  SALANAUSKAITE  Lina  Maastricht University / (CSB), University of Antwerp 
   LAZUTKA  Romas  Vilnius University 
Luxembourg  BERGER  Frédéric  Centre  d'Etudes  de  Populations,  de  Pauvreté  et  de  Politiques  Socio-
Economiques (CEPS), Differdange 
Netherlands  GOUDSWAARD  Kees  Leiden University 
   VAN VLIET  Olaf 
Norway  WEST PEDERSEN  Axel  NOVA, Oslo 
   KOREN  Charlotte  NOVA, Oslo 
Poland  PIETKA-KOSINSKA  Katarzyna  Center for Social and Economic Research (CASE), Warsaw 
Portugal  BAPTISTA  Isabel  Centro de Estudos para a Intervenção Social (CESIS), Lisboa 
   BRÁZIA  Ana  Centro de Estudos para a Intervenção Social (CESIS), Lisboa 
 Romania  RAT  Cristina  Sociology Department, "Babes-Bolyai" University Cluj-Napoca 
Slovakia  GERBERY  Daniel  Institute for Labour and Familiy Research, Bratislava 
Slovenia  KUMP  Natasa  Institute for Economic Research (IER), Ljubljana 
Spain  AIGUABELLA  Joaquim  Gabinet d'Estudis Socials SCCL, Barcelona 
  LEOTTI  Paolo   
Sweden  NELSON  Kenneth  Swedish Institute for Social Research (SOFI), Stockholm 
UK  BRADSHAW  Jonathan  Social Policy Research Unit (SPRU) / University of York  
US  STOKER  Robert  Trachtenberg school of public policy and public administration 21 
 
Figure A.  Trends in gross social assistance benefits relative to gross average wage, 1992-
2000 
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